In federal systems, governments have the opportunity to learn from the policy experiments -and the potential successes -of other governments. Whether they seize such opportunities, however, may depend on the expertise or past experiences of policymakers. Based on an analysis of a dataset on state-level adoptions of youth access antismoking adoptions, we find that states are more likely to emulate other states that have demonstrated the ability to successfully limit youth smoking. In addition, we find that political expertise (as captured by legislative professionalism) and policy expertise (as captured by previous youth access policy experiments at the local level) enhance the likelihood of emulating policy successes found in other states.
When the Smoke Clears: Expertise, Learning, and Policy Diffusion
In federal systems, subnational governments have the potential to operate as policy laboratories, experimenting with new ideas, abandoning failures, and exporting successes to other governments. A key component of the spread or diffusion of successful policies from one subnational government to the next is the ability of policymakers to learn from others' experiments and to adapt policies to meet different circumstances at home. When legislators in one state observe that another state has had success dealing with a policy problem, they may choose to enact policies similar to those found in the successful state.
States may vary, however, in the extent to which they draw upon the policy experiences of other states, with features of a state's institutional and policy environment influencing the extent to which it learns from the actions of others. As with confronting any problem where learning is involved, the experience and expertise of policymakers may affect whether and how they learn about policy successes elsewhere. To begin with, state legislators differ in their political expertise, based, among other considerations, on whether lawmakers meet year round, hold other jobs as well as being legislators, or have substantial staffs to aid in the acquisition of information and expertise. In addition, states vary considerably in their policy expertise regarding the particular policy in question. Notably, given the multiple levels of government in American federalism, expertise may be gained through experience at the local level, with localities conducting their own policy experiments.
One view of expertise is that it facilitates learning -experts can rely on their knowledge and past experiences to adapt policies found elsewhere to circumstances at home. Another view is that expertise may serve as a substitute for learning, with experts believing there is little left to be learned from others beyond what they already know from previous experiences. In either case, if expertise affects legislators' abilities or willingness to learn from policy experiments that have taken place elsewhere, then we can conclude that the diffusion of successful public policies is not universal, but rather is a conditional process, with some governments choosing policies that have been proven effective and others not learning from such successes.
In order to explore how learning affects the adoption of public policies, and how expertise affects the learning process, we utilize a comprehensive dataset of laws from the 1990s and early 2000s that aim to limit youth access to cigarettes. Our analysis contributes to the understanding of policy diffusion in two ways. First, we examine whether states learn from other states that have demonstrated policy success. In addition to showing that states are influenced by interstate learning generally, we also demonstrate that our findings are robust to alternative measures of success. Second, and more importantly, we show that the influence of learning is indeed conditional, with both the political expertise and the policy expertise within each state modifying the degree to which states emulate successful policies found elsewhere.
Diffusion, Learning, and Success
The literature on policy diffusion is vast and expanding rapidly. Fortunately, there are now a number of useful and recent literature reviews on this topic (e.g., Berry and Berry 1999; Karch 2007b in the American politics literature; Weyland 2005 and Meseguer and in comparative politics; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2005 in international relations; and Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2008 across subfields) . Especially to the extent that they cover the literature on diffusion across American states, these reviews identify seminal studies in this area (e.g., Crain 1966; Walker 1969; Gray 1973) , important methodological innovations (e.g., Berry and Berry 1990; Berry and Baybeck 2005; Volden 2006) , and conceptual advances (e.g., Braun and Gilardi 2006; Shipan and Volden 2008) .
Although our study draws on numerous insights from these earlier analyses, it moves beyond most of them in its focus on the role played by success and in its investigation of the ways in which learning from the success of others is conditional. Previous studies have not ignored the concept of learning -indeed, thorough consideration and discussion of what it means for one government to learn from another, and how this process occurs, can be found throughout the literature (e.g., Meseguer 2005; Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004; Weyland 2006; Mossberger 1999; Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Berry and Baybeck 2005; Volden 2006, 2008) . But only a handful of studies (e.g., Volden 2006; Meseguer 2006; Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet 2009; Gilardi 2010) , have conducted systematic, large-N analyses of the effect of success on diffusion. And although one study - Gilardi's (2010) recent analysis of unemployment benefits in OECD countries -has explicitly focused on the conditional nature of learning, none have considered the relationship between learning and expertise.
Instead, scholars generally have taken one of three approaches to deal with the role that learning plays in diffusion. First, some studies simply have asserted that diffusion takes place due to some combination of mechanisms -usually learning, economic spillovers, and imitationbut have not attempted to disentangle these mechanisms (e.g., Berry and Berry 1990; Shipan and Volden 2006; Karch 2007a) . Second, other studies have attempted to measure learning indirectly, either by utilizing a proxy measure designed to identify the situations in which learning is likely to take place (e.g., Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Shipan and Volden 2008) or by trying to pin down, as much as possible, other mechanisms, such as economic spillovers, and then treating learning as the residual category (e.g., Berry and Baybeck 2005) . Third, studies have relied on extensive case studies, with the corresponding strengths and weaknesses of this approach (e.g., Weyland 2006) . On the one hand, case studies provide rich, nuanced analyses of how learning can occur and what sort of effect successful policies have on adoptions by other governments; but on the other hand, the measures of success may be subject to interpretation and the generalizability of the conclusions may be open to question.
Given that most scholarship on diffusion has either explicitly or implicitly identified learning as a central component of diffusion, why have so few studies attempted either to pin down the exact relationship between success and diffusion or to isolate the conditions under which states are likely to learn from the successes of other states? One problem is that in order to conduct a large-N study of whether the success of policies affects their diffusion, three conditions must be met. First, there needs to be a generally agreed upon and objective measure of what constitutes policy success. Although in some areas success may be easy to define, in others it ends up being a more nebulous concept. For example, what constitutes success when a state adopts a lottery -the number of people who play and win, or the amount of money the lottery brings in to the state's coffers, or the effect on the overall state economy? Second, the information about the measures of success needs to be publicly available, in order to facilitate the ability of one state to learn from another. If a state can easily find out whether another state has had success in dealing with some policy area, it is much more likely to use that information in its own decision making. Third, it must be plausible that the adoption of some set of policies will help the state to achieve success.
These conditions must be met in order to analyze the effects of successful policies of one polity on the likelihood of adoption in another, and also to examine whether these effects are conditional on the political and policy expertise of policymakers. In order to determine whether learning is conditional on policy expertise or experience, two additional features must be met.
First, in the U.S. context, cities and states both must have jurisdiction to adopt laws about the policy in question. Second, data on both internal local policies within the state and external policies in other states must be available to decision makers and researchers alike.
Although these considerations have limited the amount of scholarship that assesses learning-based policy diffusion, these conditions do not substantially diminish the breadth of real-world examples of the phenomena we are interested in studying. Environmental, education, crime, and labor policies, as well as numerous others, are adopted at multiple levels of government in the U.S. and are ripe settings for policy learning.
Hypotheses
We start with the classic learning concept, which holds that a state can learn from other states. Although policymakers can learn any of a number of things from other states, here we focus on one central feature of learning: whether policies found in other states are associated with success. If a state observes such success elsewhere, then it engages in policy learning (Gilardi 2010) and is more likely to adopt the policies found in these successful states.
Evidence of policy learning arises when a successful government's policies spread more quickly and more completely to other governments than do less successful policies (e.g., Volden, Ting, Carpenter 2008) . Consider first the easiest hypothetical case, one with a single outcome and a single policy: State A is trying to decide whether or not to adopt a specific policy, X, in order to improve some policy condition, Y. If State A observes that State B has a desirable value of Y, and knows that State B has adopted X, this will increase the odds that State A will also adopt X. State A has, in effect, learned from State B's success with X, and based on this learning has decided to adopt the policy found in that other state. On the other hand, learning can cut in the opposite direction: states may be less likely to adopt a policy found in an unsuccessful state.
Most public policies, however, are not so simple. More often there is a set of policies -a policy profile -that in combination determine overall effectiveness. The logic of success-based learning, however, is the same. If State A observes a particularly effective outcome in State B, and further sees that this other state has adopted a set of policies that are likely to have contributed to this better outcome, then it will adopt a similar policy profile, mimicking much, if not all, of State B's policy profile. Our first hypothesis spells out this relationship. 
The Modifying Effect of Political Expertise
The Learning Hypothesis posits a very direct, simple relationship, where one government learns about policy from another successful government. Not all policymakers are the same, however. One key aspect on which they vary is the expertise they have when making decisions.
In this paper, we explore two forms of expertise: political and policy, each taken in order.
Political expertise may quite reasonably vary substantially across state legislatures. For example, some states pay their legislators well and provide them with large numbers of staffers who can help them handle the duties of their jobs; other states pay little, or even nothing, and provide little help in the way of staff. Some states have well-developed committee systems, while others do not. And some state legislatures meet year round, while others meet only a few weeks a year, or meet only every other year.
These differences across state legislatures are manifestations of legislative professionalism, where legislatures that meet more frequently, pay higher salaries, and have better support structures in terms of staff and committees are characterized as more professional than other legislatures. Not surprisingly, scholars have found that differences in legislative professionalism affect a range of political phenomena, with higher levels of professionalism associated with more policy innovation (Kousser 2004 ), a higher likelihood of reelection (Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000) , the incidence of divided government (Fiorina 1994) , and the ability to place constraints on bureaucratic actions (Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001) .
More generally, as Squire has observed, professionalism is a form of political expertise that affects a legislature's "capacity to generate and evaluate information in the policymaking process" (2008, 223) . The exact effect of political expertise on the ability to learn from the success of other states is, however, uncertain. On one hand, such expertise could increase the likelihood that a state would follow the lead of other, more successful, states. To begin with, state legislatures that are more professional will be more likely to identify which other states have had policy successes and what policies those states have passed. In addition, the staffers and committees in highly professional legislatures will be better able to evaluate the policy experiments found in other states and to determine whether those successful experiments will work in their own state. Finally, these highly professionalized legislatures will be more likely have the time and other resources needed to pass new laws that are based on the information they have learned about other states' policy experiments. In this first account, then, political expertise, as measured by legislative professionalism, should increase the likelihood of learning from success, largely because -as Squire notes in his definition -more professional legislatures have higher evaluative capacities. Squire also notes, however, that highly professionalized legislatures are more likely to be able to generate their own information. They do not need to look elsewhere for evidence of success, because they can produce their own ideas about which policies are likely to work in their own states. In the area of antismoking laws, for example, staffers can read the relevant medical and public health literatures; committees can invite experts to provide testimony about the potential effects of various policy options; and the legislature will have time to consider different alternatives. All of this can be done without reference to what has happened in other states. Rather, it is the less professionalized legislatures, which lack these abilities, that are precisely the ones that benefit from the experiments conducted in other states and that are therefore more likely to learn from successes in these other states. In this view, then, the effect of success should decrease with political expertise (i.e., the effect of success is greater for less professionalized legislatures than for more professionalized legislatures). We formulate these two views as competing hypotheses: 
Youth Access Laws
To examine these hypotheses, we draw upon a set of antismoking restrictions known as youth access laws. These laws tend to have two related goals. First, most of these laws are geared toward making it more difficult for children to purchase cigarettes. Along these lines, for example, states have enacted minimum age requirements for the purchase of cigarettes, restrictions on the location of vending machines, and penalties for establishments that sell cigarettes to those under the age requirements. Second, states also have passed laws that more directly attempt to reduce youth smoking rates. Most notably, many states have laws that create education and awareness programs aimed at teenagers and other children. Overall, then, youth access laws are designed to both directly and indirectly reduce youth smoking rates.
The effects of these laws can be measured in two ways. states must conduct sting operations (or other similar approaches), organized according to specific protocols, to determine the rate at which teens are able to purchase cigarettes.
Beginning in 1996 or 1997 (depending on the state), all were required to report the results of these sting operations to SAMHSA. Since the SAPT funds from the federal government have totaled between $1.5 and $2 billion per year, states have a strong financial incentive to participate, and all states have reported the findings of their investigations on a yearly basis.
Second, since 1991 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has completed and maintained the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS). As part of this system, the CDC conducts the Youth Risk Behavior Survey on a variety of teenagers' activities, including smoking. 3 Furthermore, the data from this survey is amassed at the state level. The YRBSS data, therefore, provide state-level information on smoking rates among teenagers.
These measures -compliance with the Synar Amendment and the YRBSS data on smoking rates -give us two separate, but related, indicators of state policy success. Reducing the rates at which teens are able to purchase cigarettes and lowering smoking rates among teens are clearly the goals of these programs; hence, we have clear, objective, and agreed-upon measures of success, meeting the first requirement for an analysis of the diffusion of successful policies. The second requirement is also clearly met: this information is easily available to states, with the federal government posting the data online to facilitate easy access.
The third requirement is that there needs to be a clear link between enactment of these policies and success -in other words, that youth access laws actually make it more difficult for youths to purchase cigarettes. 4 To begin with, laws that require people purchasing cigarettes to show identification, that assess fines on stores that are caught selling cigarettes to minors, and that restrict the placement of vending machines to establishments that minors do not frequent (e.g., bars) are all plausibly likely to reduce youth access. In addition, the evidence suggests that these sorts of laws can change the behavior of retailers, making it less likely that they will sell cigarettes to people who are younger than the legal age (e.g., Forster and Wolfson 1998) .
Although few studies have examined the link between youth access laws and the rates of illegal purchases by minors, public health scholars have conducted numerous studies of the relationship between youth access laws and smoking rates among teens. Many of these studies have found strong evidence that tobacco control policies aimed at teenagers do reduce rates of smoking in this age group (e.g., Ross and Chaloupka 2004; Luke et al. 2000 ; but see also Lantz et al. 2000) and that lowering the rate of sales to minors also lowers the prevalence of youth smoking (e.g., Dent and Biglan 2004) . Given the plausible case that youth access laws are effective (and indeed that some types of restrictions may work better than others), given the ability of states to discern which laws worked the best elsewhere, and given data about policy adoptions at both the state and local levels, this policy area provides an ideal setting in which to test hypotheses about learning and its conditional nature based on expertise.
Methods and Data
As we discussed earlier, there are very few large-N studies of the role that success can play in the diffusion of public policies. Here we draw on a major exception, Volden's (2006) Thus our analysis reveals not which states adopt any policy change, but rather, conditional on a state making a policy change, whether that state learns about policy successes elsewhere and whether such learning is enhanced or diminished based on political and policy expertise.
Dependent Variable
To develop a measure of state-level youth access laws, we began by identifying sixteen different youth access laws that state legislatures have adopted, ranging from restrictions on the 6 Gilardi and Fuglister (2008) study health insurance subsidy policies across Swiss cantons with this method. Meseguer (2006) uses an alternative and complementary approach. 7 This limitation has the added benefit of removing from the dataset all years in which states did not hold legislative sessions or in which they held sessions that focused on specific topics only (which is harder to control for). If we focus only on states that met in regular session, rather than limiting our analysis to states that have taken any action, we obtain substantively similar results.
locations of vending machines to delivery restrictions to requirements that all young purchasers show identification as proof of age. 8 For our dependent variable, we need to measure the extent to which each state moves toward each other state's policy profile -that is, toward the set of policies that the other state has previously adopted -in any given year. To determine the complete list of youth access policies that each state has adopted, as well as the year in which they were adopted, we relied on the State Cancer Legislative Database (SCLD), which is a compilation of all state-level antismoking laws. 9 We collected this information for all states over the entire period of our study, which runs from either 1992 or 1997 (depending on which measure of success we use) through 2002, the time period of the most dramatic change in state youth access policies, and the period that contains the best available policy success information. The sixteen aspects of youth access policy that we examine are: age requirements, youth penalties, free distribution restrictions, vending machine restrictions, out-of-package sales restrictions, ID requirements, sign posting requirements, vendor licensing requirements, vendor penalties, location restrictions, education and awareness activities, behind-the-counter sales requirements, delivery and shipping restrictions, task force authorization, random inspections, and bidi restrictions. Also clearly relevant to whether youths purchase tobacco is cost, which governments can affect through taxes. However, because tobacco taxes are adopted for a variety of reasons, extending beyond youth access considerations, we do not include taxes among our policy changes. Future work exploring the conditional nature of learning regarding tax policy (whether pertaining to youth access to tobacco or other areas) would be welcome. 9 SCLD data can be accessed at http://www. 
Results
We begin our dyad-year event history analysis by testing the Learning Hypothesis. Since the dependent variable in our first test, Movement Toward State B, is dichotomous, we rely on logit estimation. In addition, to control for possible lack of independence across observationsparticularly because there may be features of State B that we are not capturing in our models and that will influence whether other states will imitate it -we cluster by State B, an approach that adjusts the standard errors to account for any discerned non-independence and for possible heteroskedasticity concerns. 20 To control for further possible temporal dependence in the hazard rates of adoption of State B's policies, we include year dummies (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) . 19 We also investigated whether there might be an interactive effect between the success variables and the similarity variables. Holding all other variables at their mean, the predicted probability that Movement Toward State B will take on a value of 1 increases from 0.38 when Synar Noncompliance Ratio is one standard 21 Including Total Previous Laws is especially important as a control, because having already adopted several youth access laws may have a dampening effect on the opportunity to emulate others. This variable could also, in some ways, be thought of as an additional form of policy expertise, beyond local youth access adoptions. Unfortunately, exploring whether the adoption of previous laws leads to greater learning from success elsewhere also raises some serious methodological issues. For example, while more policy experience at the state level may enhance the ability to learn, it also limits the number of new policies about which to learn, as many of those policies most expected to be successful have already been tried. Additionally, the amount of pressure for major policy change may be greater with no youth access laws on the books than with many such laws, leading to a greater likelihood of emulation of successes when there are fewer previous laws adopted. Preliminary analyses show significant nonlinearities in the effect of our success variables on emulation, depending on how many previous laws had been adopted in State A. Further disentangling the interrelated nature of learning from success and internal policy change over time is beyond the scope of our current paper, but is likely to be a fruitful line of future research.
deviation below its mean to 0.51 when it the success measure is one standard deviation above its mean. Similarly, the predicted probability changes from 0.42 to 0.47 when Youth Smoking Rate Ratio increases from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above its mean; and the probability moves from 0.36 to 0.54 when both success variables move from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above their means. 23 Thus, comparing the most successful states (a standard deviation or more above the mean) to the least successful states (a standard deviation or more below the mean), the policies of the most successful states are emulated in a significant majority of policy changes whereas the policies of the least successful states are emulated in less than one third of all policy changes.
[Insert of the story about which states are emulated is based on learning from successes, rather than mere imitation or fads across similar states. The control for previous laws adopted is negative and significant, as expected. Finally, although the coefficient for Local Laws is insignificant, the 23 We used prvalue in Stata 11 to calculate the predicted probabilities. The size of the coefficients can also be interpreted by their effects on the odds of State A adopting policies that move its profile toward State B. The odds increase by approximately 30% for each additional unit of increase in either of our success measures. coefficient on Legislative Professionalism is negative and strongly significant, suggesting that more professionalized legislatures are, all else equal, less likely in general to copy other states.
Although Model 1 supports the Learning Hypothesis, there is reason to question whether these results accurately and completely capture the degree of learning from policy success.
Recall that the dependent variable in this first model is a dichotomous variable, taking on a value of 1 if a state moves toward another state's policy profile more than it moves away. Although this captures the overall relationship between two states' policy choices, and although it follows the approach used in other dyadic studies (e.g., Volden 2006), it ignores relevant information.
Suppose, for example, that Indiana and Iowa had no youth access laws at all in a given year, and
Illinois had eight different laws at that time. Now suppose that in the next year, Indiana adopts one law that is found in Illinois, while Iowa adopts six of the eight laws that are already in effect in Illinois. Clearly, Iowa has moved more toward Illinois than has Indiana; yet the dependent variable in Model 1 treats Iowa and Indiana equivalently. More generally, with more than a dozen different youth access policies that states can adopt, one state could move only slightly toward another, or could take many more steps toward that other state. In addition, such effects accumulate over time and through compounded learning as other states experience success with these youth access policies.
Political Expertise and Learning from Success
The results in the previous section demonstrate that successful states are more likely to be emulated than states that have demonstrated little policy success. A state is much more likely to adopt aspects of another state's policy profile if that second state has relatively low rates of youth smoking or high rates of compliance with the goals of the Synar Amendment. These findings contribute to the small but growing set of studies that have investigated whether policies in successful states are more likely to diffuse. We turn now to our other, more novel, hypotheses.
As discussed earlier, political expertise could have two potential effects on the influence of success: an increasing effect, in which more professional legislatures are better able to learn about and adopt policies found in successful states; and a decreasing effect, in which more professional legislatures have less need to draw upon others' successes. To test these hypotheses, we need to determine whether the effects of success vary with the level of professionalism; and to do that, we interact our success and our political expertise measures.
Thus, we interact both Synar Noncompliance Ratio and Youth Smoking Rate Ratio with
Legislative Professionalism, and add these interaction terms (in separate equations) to Model 2.
25 25 We present the results for Synar Noncompliance Ratio and Youth Smoking Rate Ratio separately, both because of high collinearity -the correlation between the two interactive terms is r = 0.53 -and because separate reporting makes it easier to disentangle the independent effects of each success measure when we plot the effects of our regressions. The results remain basically unchanged, however, if we include both success measures along with their interaction terms in a single equation. This is also true for the tests of our Policy Expertise Hypotheses. 
Policy Expertise and Learning from Success
The results in Table 2 and Figure 1 The results, reported in Table 3 Tables 2 and 3 thus show that as state policymakers increase either their political or their policy expertise, they are more likely to learn from and emulate successful states.
28 Because of high correlations between Local Laws and our success measures, we were concerned that our results might be affected by multicollinearity problems. To address this, we explored numerous ways to reduce the level of multicollinearity (e.g., calculating Local Laws differently, creating dichotomous or trichotomous versions of the variable, and so on). The results were very robust to all of these sorts of changes.
Conclusion
State policymakers face a multitude of decisions every year. When deciding whether to adopt certain policies, they can rely on their own acquired expertise or try to learn from the experiences of others. Our analysis shows that states do indeed learn from other states. Upon observing that another state has achieved success in dealing with a policy area, policymakers in other states are more likely to move toward that successful state, by adopting similar policy profiles. More specifically, we found that states that are more successful in reducing youth access to cigarettes and youth smoking rates are more likely to be emulated than are other states.
The finding that successful states are more likely to be emulated is interesting in its own right, but it also provides a baseline for a more intriguing and novel set of results. Squire (2007) . k Constructed by authors based on data from the American Nonsmokers' Rights Foundation. 
